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SANE AND PRAGMATIC LIBERALISM: THE ACTION 
GROUP IN BULAWAYO, 1955-1965
I. R. HANCOCK
Australian National University, Canberra
O n 1 august 1972 six Europeans met in a private house in Bulawayo and 
resolved to disband their society, hand over the assets of Rh$197 to charity 
and deposit the surviving records in the National Archives. In this way the 
Action Group, formed thirty years before, was quietly dissolved, its dis­
appearance hardly noticed by the majority of the nominal membership. A 
fall in interest had been apparent for about eight years and the Group had only 
lingered on because a few members had hoped for revival of those headier 
days when they held regular and vigorous discussions and exercised a degree 
of political influence. This was the period, from the mid-1940s to the late 
1950s, when the Group virtually controlled the Matabeleland branches of the 
federal and territorial governing parties, when ministers made special trips 
to Bulawayo to attend Group meetings, and government proposals were 
presented to the Group in order to have them tested in well informed and 
intellectually rigorous discussion. Most of the members were then in their 
thirties and forties, their careers were in business or the professions, they 
were deeply attached to Bulawayo, critical and perhaps envious of Salisbury, 
and confident that their own brand of sane and pragmatic liberalism re­
presented the best hope for economic development and political stability. 
By the early 1960s, however, as the membership was getting older the Group 
was becoming irrelevant. Already divided and weakened by a split within 
the territorial governing party in 1958, the Group was powerless to prevent 
the collapse of the Federation which it had so ardently supported or the 
advent of extremist politics which it so little understood. All attempts to find 
a new role failed and it was sentiment alone, a quality not so evident in the 
younger active days, which kept the Group going until a handful of members 
called a halt in 1972.
Although the records of the Action Group are incomplete,' and the 
Group’s political influence was beginning to decline at the point where the 
full minutes are available, the surviving material provides some insights into 
recent Southern Rhodesian history, especially for the period from 1955 to i
i The surviving records of the Action Group are lodged in the National Archives of 
Rhodesia [Historical Manuscripts Collection] AC3. The full minutes and occasional 
correspondence and reports are available from 1955 while account books and member­
ship rolls date from an earlier period.
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1965. In the first place, because of the Group’s central political role in Mata- 
beleland, members were drawn into discussions about the major issues of 
the day and heard, in confidence, opinions and information which were 
not often published or recorded elsewhere. These occasions were noted 
in extensive minutes which are now useful sources for modem white 
history. Secondly, the minutes are valuable because they incoporate the 
attitudes of people who thought of themselves as ‘moderate’ and ‘progressive’. 
Members of the Action Group were certainly not the only European liberals 
in Southern Rhodesia during the Federation, nor was their particular view­
point shared by all the Europeans who claimed to be liberal, but a study 
of their attitudes reveals something of the extent and limitations of white 
liberalism, a phenomenon which flourished and largely foundered in the 
‘partnership’ years. It is mainly to illustrate this second theme that the records, 
supplemented by other evidence, are used in this article.
The Action Group was formed in 1942,2 principally on the initiative 
of Peter Gibbs3 a London-bom engineer. Along with a few personal friends 
in Bulawayo Gibbs was dissatisfied with the calibre of the war-time Cabinet 
which he thought was a ministry of old men of limited or declining ability. 
Originally the idea was to construct a policy to serve as the basis for an 
alternative party. Among the issues discussed were native affairs, the railways, 
minerals policy, fiscal matters and the paltry parliamentary salaries which 
prevented a new generation from entering politics. One early member was 
Julian Greenfield4 then a practising lawyer in Bulawayo, a man with an 
instinct for manoeuvre and action rather than discussion and ideas. It was 
Greenfield who persuaded another eleven out of sixteen members at a meeting 
in 1944 that they were being too academic and should instead join the ‘mori­
bund’ United Party led by Godfrey Huggins and capture what remained of 
its Matabeleland branch. Membership of the United Party was made com­
pulsory and Gibbs promptly resigned, stood as a candidate for the opposi­
tion Liberal Party in 1948, and did not re-join the Group until ten years 
later.
Meanwhile the Group prospered. Several members became office-bearers 
in the United Party in Matabeleland, a number also stood for parliament,
2 The evidence for the formation and early history of the Group is drawn mainly from 
interviews with the following: P. B. Gibbs, 23 Apr. 1974; J. M. Greenfield, 24 Apr. 
1974; A. L. Lewis, 27 Apr. 1974; F. L. Wigley, 24 Apr. 1974. The National Archives 
have recorded an interview with Greenfield which includes a section on the Group’s 
formation; see Oral/GR 2, 18-20. See also C. Leys, European Politics in Southern 
Rhodesia (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1959), 156-7.
3 Gibbs, b.1903; in Southern Rhodesia since 1934; captain B.S.A.P.; author and 
engineer.
4 Greenfield, b. in Bulawayo 1909; educated Bulawayo and Cape Town; Oxford 
University as a Rhodes scholar; advocated in the High Court of Southern Rhodesia 
1933; United Party M.P., 1948-53; territorial minister, 1950-53; Federal Minister, 
1953-63; High Court judge, 1968-74.
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although only Greenfield and Cyril Hatty3 were successful before 1954. 
During the 1940s the Group made annual donations to the United Party of 
more than £200 and gave special assistance to favoured candidates in the 1946 
and 1948 elections.6 Yet there was nothing especially clever or devious about 
the way in which the Action Group established its presence. Control of the 
party in Matabeleland was achieved simply through being the only active 
body in an area where minimal organisation was bound to bring results. The 
Action Group was not, and did not need to be, an extra-parliamentary 
machine; politics in Matabeleland were always informal and only ceased to be 
leisurely during elections. The same held true for a time after 1953 when the 
United Party divided into the F.P. (Federal Party) to fight in the federal 
sphere and the U.R.P. (United Rhodesia Party) to operate on the territorial 
level: and the Action Group continued to wield influence on both parties 
although rather more effectively within the latter.7 Nevertheless there were at 
least two occasions when members did act collectively as a pressure group. 
The first was when they decided to give financial assistance to the United 
Central Africa Association and resolved to campaign for the Federal cause 
leading up to the referendum of April 1953.® The second occurred when Green­
field and Garfield Todd emerged as rival candidates to succeed Huggins as 
Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia. After consulting with Greenfield, who 
indicated that he wanted to follow Huggins into federal politics, the Group 
tesolved to support Todd who was subsequently elected, a factor which helps 
to explain why Todd became so scrupulous in sounding out Group opinion.9 
In the main, however, the members preferred another kind of ‘action’: a con­
tinuing dialogue with territorial and federal ministers on subjects ranging 
from European immigration to labour relations, education, housing and 
communications. And, for their part, a number of ministers obviously con­
sidered it a duty to submit themselves and their departmental performance to 
close scrutiny and, at times, sharp criticism.
One reason why ministers were prepared to do this was the assurance 
of meeting a discreet, intelligent and basically sympathetic audience. Apart 
from requiring all members to belong to the United Party, and later to the 
F.P. and the U.R.P., every effort was made to ensure that new members shared
s C. J. Hatty, b. in U.K. 1908; in Southern Rhodesia since 1937; company manager; 
territorial M.P., 1950-62; territorial minister, 1953-8, 1958-62.
« See AC3/3 [Balance Sheets and Accounts], 1 (1 Aug. 1944-22 Feb. 1971), 1946, 
1948.
7 The F.P. was always considered to be the more conservative and from the start 
a number of Group members were worried about the relationship between the two parties. 
Greenfield claimed that the Group did not have much influence on federal politics, 
interview with Greenfield, 24 Apr. 1974.
b Interview with Wigley, 24 Apr. 1974.
s The evidence for Todd’s election is based on the previously cited interviews with 
Greenfield, Lewis and Wigley. See also Leys, European Politics in Southern Rhodesia, 
157. According to Todd the Action Group consisted of ‘people of weight’ and ‘leading 
people in the Party’. It was ‘wise to take note of them’, interview with R. S. Garfield 
Todd, 27 Mar 1974.
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the assumptions and outlook of the Group as a whole. To achieve this 
objective the membership was restricted to around thirty and recruited from 
a fairly tight circle of friends and acquaintances. In 1955, for example, with 
the exception of Captain Hopkins10 who was a rancher, all were professional 
or business people resident, in Bulawayo. There were engineers, doctors, 
teachers, dentists, city officials, accountants, lawyers, company directors and 
executives. A number held directorships in the same companies involved 
in the building industry, textiles or finance." Ranging in age from their late 
thirties to their mid-fifties all but two were men and all save half a dozen 
were members of the Bulawayo Club. A third were born in Bulawayo, a 
third in South Africa and of the remaining third most were British. Several 
were prominent in local affairs: Mrs Brett, for instance, was to become Mayor 
of Bulawayo in 1960, Arthur Sibson was the City Engineer as well as a noted 
composer, Dr Hugh Ashton12 was the City Director of African Administra­
tion, Benny Goldstein13 was chairman of the Bulawayo Chamber of Com­
merce for some years, A. L. Lewis1-1 was the chairman of the Bulawayo 
Rhodesian National Affairs Association. A number, too, occupied key posi­
tions in federal and territorial organisations; Goldstein was at one stage 
chairman of the Southern Rhodesian Chamber of Commerce while Malcolm 
Fleming15 chaired the Federal Chamber and was a member of the Central 
Africa Currency Board. In 1954. with Greenfield sitting in the Federal 
Assembly as a minister, A. E. Abrahamson16 and Cyril Hatty were members 
of the Southern Rhodesian Legislative Assembly and Hatty was a minister 
in Todd’s Cabinet. After the federal and territorial elections of 1958 J. A. 
Clark17 and Captain Hopkins joined Greenfield in the federal house while 
Goldstein sat with Abrahamson and Hatty in the territorial parliament. The 
point is that whether they belonged to business or professional associations, 
social clubs or parliaments, the members of the Group were active and often 
notable in public affairs, disposed towards a practical rather than abstract or 
ideological approach to politics, and had come together through shared 
interests, experiences and convictions.
■ °H . S. Hopkins, b. Bulawayo 1906; R. N. retd.; Federal M.P., 1958-63.
ii Most of the companies were based in Bulawayo although Wigley and P. A. Jousse
were resident directors of a number of South African and British companies. Wigley, b. 
in Nottingham 1912; in Southern Rhodesia since 1939; director of mining, cement and 
finance companies. Jousse, born in Johannesburg 1915; co-director with Wigley.
'2 E. H. Ashton, b. in Basutoland 1911; Oxford and London Universities; Rhodes 
scholar; Southern Rhodesia since 1949.
'a Goldstein, b. in Rumania 1902; Southern Rhodesia since 1907; director of own 
wholesale business; Group chairman in 1956; territorial M.P., 1958-65.
Lewis, b. in Bulawayo 1919; accountant.
is Fleming, b. in Transvaal 1905; Southern Rhodesia since 1930; director of con­
struction companies in Bulawayo; Group chairman in 1955. Fleming made substantial 
donations to the Group in the 1940s; see AG3/3/1, passim.
is Abrahamson, b. in Bulawayo 1922; in business in clothing, steel, engineering; terri­
torial M.P. 1954-65; territorial minister, 1958-62
17 J. A. Clark, b. in Durban 1914; Southern Rhodesia since 1939; company secretary; 
Federal M.P., 1958-63; chief government whip and federal minister, 1959-63.
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The strongest of these convictions in the 1950s was that the Gfentral 
African Federation represented the key to the economic future of Southern 
Rhodesia. If the Federation could be made to work then Southern Rhodesia 
could take advantage of an expanding market and the importation of capital, 
technology and skilled white artisans, all to the benefit of industrial, construc­
tion and investment activity in Bulawayo. Having, therefore, argued and cam­
paigned for the Federation the members were plainly disappointed by the sub­
sequent record of the Federal Government. They were particularly critical of 
what they saw as unimaginative leadership and policies, the persisting and 
growing divisions between the F.P. and U.R.P., and the failure to convert 
African hostility to approval. These three issues were to receive constant 
attention during the mid-1950s.
A major complaint was that the Federal Government had not seized the 
opportunities presented by the new association. By early 195618 the Group 
had compiled a whole list of grievances 6n this theme: the inefficiency of 
the F.P. organisation, the lack of Cabinet co-ordination and co-ordination 
between the Federal and Southern Rhodesian ministers, the failure of the 
Departments of Agriculture, Immigration and Transport, the unwillingness 
of the Federal Government to assume full responsibility for African advance­
ment and labour relations in industry. F. S. Owen of Home Affairs and 
J. M. Caldicott of Agriculture were both adjudged to be incompetent. The 
Group was plainly shocked to learn at a meeting on 17 November 1955 how 
the two ministers not only held different views about the desirability of in­
creased European immigration but that Owen’s own plans presupposed more 
of the initiative being taken by outside bodies than by himself. This particular 
meeting also led to some rather acid exchanges when Owen indicated he 
could not or would not prevent the occupation of land by immigrant Afrikaner 
farmers. Nor did the criticism stop at subordinate ministers. Huggins (now 
Lord Malvern) was attacked for not supplying effective and imaginative 
leadership. He was accused of tolerating incompetence, of doing little to im­
prove Cabinet co-ordination and of failing to recognise the build-up of public 
dissatisfaction. The Group in fact told Sir Roy Welensky on 25 September 
1955 how they looked forward to his becoming Prime Minister on the ex­
pectation of bolder policies for developing agriculture and the transport 
system and for encouraging British and British South African immigration. 
Perhaps Owen had flattered the Group by referring to its ‘federal outlook’ 
on public affairs and to its potential for changing the policies of high officials; 
the members would have been more impressed by positive evidence of the 
Federal Government taking its own tasks seriously.
'e AC3/8/1 [Minutes of Meetings: 1 Feb. 1955-1 Aug. 1972], 5 Jan. 1956. Unless 
otherwise stated all references to discussions and opinions will be found in the minutes 
of meetings in this file and will not normally be cited separately.
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Part of the problem was thought to be the existence of two political 
parties, each purporting to follow the same policies within different areas yet 
at times diverging to the point of complete rupture. The Group as a whole 
favoured a fusion as a step towards the co-ordination of policies between 
governments and a step back from a real split which could only benefit the 
opposition.19 But here the Group was in something of a dilemma. On one 
side there was a lot to be said for the emergence of a strong opposition able 
to test and probe the Federal Government and for the advent of conventional 
two-party politics as evidence of the maturity and acceptability of the Federa­
tion. On the other side the immediate prospects for a strong opposition were 
of one hostile to the Federation and based on white reaction and isolationism 
in Southern Rhodesia. Opposition victories in a Federal and a territorial by- 
election during the first half of 1956 highlighted this danger from the right 
and the Group responded by pressing even harder for fusion. Then in June
1956 Todd attacked Malvern at a U.R.P. Congress in Gwelo suggesting that 
the U.R.P. might have to make its own separate entry into federal politics 
unless Malvern’s Government adopted a more dynamic policy.20 Although 
Group members appreciated the sentiment lying behind the speech they 
‘summoned’ Todd to Bulawayo to explain himself. From this point the 
Group worked on both Todd and Welensky urging them to join forces. 
Several meetings were arranged, including a crucial one on 14 February
1957 attended by thirteen delegates from throughout the Federation of whom 
three — Greenfield, Colonel J. R. Webb2' and P. H. Agar22 — were members 
of the Action Group. By the middle of 1957 when fusion seemed further away 
because of differing approaches to franchise changes, members prepared 
documents isolating the differences between the proposed Federal and Southern 
Rhodesian franchise laws and tried to show how the differences were either 
infinitesimal or could be resolved by compromise.23 Finally at a meeting in 
Ndola in September, the parties agreed to fuse as the U.F.P. (United Federal 
Party). Clearly the Group was at least partly responsible. For while Julian 
Greenfield had made it a personal cause to unite the parties and did this on 
his own initiative,24 the Group had thrust itself into the centre of the principal 
discussions and prompted some of them to take place. The motive throughout 
was the same: to preserve and strengthen the Federation and protect it from 
the opposition in Southern Rhodesia. Even so some members were wary
'9 There were a number of Group discussions on the fusion held in late 1956 and for 
the first nine months of 1957.
2° Todd later regretted making this speech as he was accused of attacking the Federal 
Prime Minister when he was out of the country, interview with Todd, 27 Mar. 1974.
21 Webb, Southern Rhodesia since 1943; company director and active in federal 
territorial and Bulawayo chambers of commerce; Group chairman from the late 1960s 
until 1972.
22 P. H. Agar, b. in Britain 1923; Southern Rhodesia since 1942; director of a building 
company; chairman of the Group in 1958 and 1959.
23 AC3/7/1 [Memoranda: 1956-63], 8 (Comparison of Some Aspects of the Respec­
tive Franchise Proposals of Southern Rhodesia and the Federation, n.d.).
24 Interview with Greenfield, 24 Apr. 1974.
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because they foresaw an enhanced F.P. influence in Southern Rhodesian 
politics and, with it, the deadening hand of conservatism controlling the old 
U.R.P. It took just five months to prove them right.
Given their commitment to the Federation it is not surprising that 
members regularly returned to the problem of continued African opposition. 
Initially there were hopes of the Federal Government assuming additional 
powers and intervening in native affairs in order to implement the concept of 
partnership. By 1957 the majority of members were beginning to despair of 
the Federal Government ever understanding the need for decisive action. 
Greenfield, inevitably, was an exception. J. A. Clark was another who stressed 
that Africans should not be rushed into politics.25 During 1956 a few members, 
including Hugh Ashton, emphasised instead the greater importance of building 
up African confidence in the Federation. Unfortunately for them two factors 
in 1956 and 1957 made it unlikely that the Africans could ever be won over. 
First, there was persistent talk within the F.P. of pressing for dominion status 
for the Federation, a move certain to be popular among Europeans and 
guaranteed to arouse African suspicions about entrenching white rule. In 
1956 the majority in the Group supported dominion status as a logical step 
in the progress of the Federation. Within a year, however, the mood had 
changed and most members were arguing for the prior step of mollifying 
African opinion in all three territories. The second factor was the proposed 
federal franchise which introduced the concept of a dual roll and which, 
considered alongside demands for dominion status, could be interpreted by 
Africans as an attempt to cement racial inequality. By the end of 1957, 
therefore, the majority in the Group had become convinced that the Federal 
Government was bent on antagonising the black opposition rather than paci­
fying it.
On 16 February 1956 the Group discussed future changes in the federal 
franchise. The members voted in favour of the idea of using whatever 
Southern Rhodesian qualifications were in existence at the time of the federal 
elections, provided that the present Southern Rhodesian qualifications were 
raised to a higher level. This was hardly a radical proposal, and would merely 
have reinforced the conviction of some Southern Rhodesian Africans that the 
Europeans in Central Africa would use any means to restrict voting rights. 
Nevertheless the Group did commit itself to the principle of the common 
roll. In any case members were primarily concerned at this stage to delay the 
proposed revisions of the federal electoral legislation until after a promised 
Southern Rhodesian commission had returned its findings on the territorial 
franchise. On 1 June Greenfield reported on the progress achieved in civil 
service discussions and the proposal to introduce a dual roll. Under the scheme
zs See, for example, the proposals of Clark’s Umgusa F.P. branch for the meetings 
of 1 Nov. 1956.
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members for the existing twenty-six seats would be elected by voters on an 
A roll based on a high qualification while less qualified persons could register 
on a B roll and elect up to nine additional members although, as each B roll 
seat was instituted, an existing special seat for African interests would be 
abolished. The Group met again on 14 June and rejected this proposal despite 
their fears that the European voters in the Copperbelt would be swamped by 
African voters if the common roll was maintained — ‘a point which would 
have to be faced sooner or later . . . [and some members] . . . felt the later 
the better but no conclusions were reached’. Like Mrs Sutherby most felt 
that ‘political advancement should not be stimulated’. On 1 November 1957 
Hugh Ashton summarised the Group’s objections to the dual roll:26 It would 
introduce racialism and debase the franchise, hasten an extension of the 
suffrage by offering limited voting powers which Africans would demand 
and expect to be extended, be hypocritical because once an African won a B 
roll seat there would be one less special representative of African interests. 
He also pointed out how special voters under a new Southern Rhodesian 
law27 would have fewer rights in federal elections thereby giving substance 
to the charge of the Federation being a disadvantage to Africans. Clearly 
the Group’s own preferences were mixed: while members opposed discrimina­
tion on grounds of colour and wanted to retain the common roll for federal 
elections, they also wanted to ensure that any extension of the franchise 
would be gradual and based on a strictly maintained standard of civilisation. 
They were certainly not in favour of immediate progress toward black rule 
in Northern let alone Southern Rhodesia. Their real objective was to secure 
the future of the Federation. Throughout the discussions of 1956 and 1957 
the emphasis was given to the quest for a settled electoral law, one where 
the vote would only be available to federal citizens, and where responsible 
persons of all races would be satisfied that their interests would be protected 
and advanced by a continued association. Perhaps the quest itself was an 
unreal one yet the attempt does explain why so many members became 
frustrated not only by Greenfield’s insistence on proceeding with the dual 
roll but also by his approach of simply imposing a decision from above. 
As Hugh Ashton argued on 1 November, even if the dual roll was the least 
objectionable of all the schemes,
then the Federal Government’s duty was clearly to publicise and 
popularise it, particularly among Africans. Their failure to do so 
was typical of its general failure even to attempt to win African 
support. Unless African support was forthcoming neither permanent 
progress nor the real stability of the Federation could be assured.
26 For the final federal franchise see Leys, European Politics in Southern Rhodesia, 
235-6 and C. Palley, The Constitutional History and Law of Southern Rhodesia, 1888- 
1965 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1966), 392, 394-5.
27 See below, 71-3.
I. R. H A N C O C K 73
The Group’s approach to territorial representation was no less pragmatic. 
The issue had to be faced because of the appointment of the Tredgold Com­
mission in December 1956 in fulfilment of Todd’s election promise to under­
take a revision of the franchise before the next poll. On 17 January 1957 
the Action Group met to formulate its own proposals for submission to 
Tredgold and. specifically, to consider a paper prepared by Mrs Sutherby 
who advocated a widening of the franchise based on the common roll.28 
According to the provisions of the Electoral Act of 1951 a person qualified 
tor the vote by earning an annual income of £240 or owning property to the 
value of £500, or by being the spouse of someone who met either of these 
two requirements. Under these provisions there were, in November 1956, 
52 184 registered voters of whom only 560 were Africans.29 Mrs Sutherby 
proposed to increase the number of enfranchised Africans and alter the 
character of the African electorate by dropping the property qualification 
and retaining the income requirement at the 1951 level. She also urged the 
introduction of an alternative educational qualification whereby Africans 
who had obtained their Standard VI could register. Finally there was the 
suggestion of a special clause enfranchising ‘responsible’ Africans who would 
otherwise be debarred by the educational or income requirement. The Group’s 
reaction was generally cautious. There was strong support for the idea of 
enrolling ‘particularly worthy persons’ and members proposed the creation 
of an Appeal Board to hear the claims of people like ministers of religion. 
Indeed, precisely because the aim was to enrol a particular element — ‘the 
stable members of the African community’ — the Group retained the pro­
perty qualification in its memorandum to the Tredgold Commission while 
lowering the figure to £250.3° The main worry was that if the holders of 
Standard VI were enfranchised between 20 000 and 25 000 Africans would 
suddely come on to the roll, an invasion which would upset ordered political 
progress and threaten the balance of racial power. To avoid this possibility 
the Group proposed to raise the educational qualification to Standard VIII. 
The aim throughout was minimal reform: to advance far enough to en­
franchise conservative Africans and no further than necessary to isolate the 
extremists, to convince Africans that they were not being permanently ex­
cluded from the roll while ‘retaining political power in European hands’. 
A number of members were even afraid of declaring their support for the 
principle of universal suffrage believing that such a declaration might be 
construed as support for an immediate extension of the franchise. They had 
visions of ‘untutored’ Africans being swayed by the oratory of demagogues, 
visions which convinced most white liberals in the 1950s of the virtue of the 
status quo in preference to revolution or reaction.
asA C 3/7/l/3  (S.R. Franchise Commission [1957 Jan.], Proposed Ideas . . . for 
the Action Group’s Evidence . . . ).
2® Leys, European Politics in Southern Rhodesia, 196.
3°A C 3/7 /l/4  (Memorandum for Submission to the . . .  Franchise Commission).
74 S A N E  A N D  P R A G M A TIC  LIB E R A LIS M
The Group forwarded its memorandum to the Commission and then met 
on 16 May to consider the Tredgold findings.31 The Commission proposed 
four categories for the franchise: three sets of ordinary qualifications and a 
special fourth qualification whereby literate Africans who earned £180 a year 
could register provided that the votes would not come to more than a third 
of the total votes cast in any one seat. Criticism was levelled at what members 
thought was the low financial requirement of the fourth category. There was 
concern about the effects of inflation which would reduce the value of the 
figure of £180 to an unsatisfactory index of responsibility.
Discussion was postponed, however, before the Group decided whether 
to support its own plan for a modest extension of the vote or the idea of a 
wider franchise with limited powers. By the time the next general meeting 
was held the representation issue had split the U.R.P. caucus. Todd threatened 
to resign unless the party agreed to his modified version of the Tredgold 
proposals, which raised the special qualification and lowered the weighting 
of the special vote.32 A large section of the caucus thought Todd was going too 
far. A final decision was due on 19 June and at ‘considerable effort on his 
part’ Todd rushed to Bulawayo the day before to explain his stand to the 
Group. He told them he preferred a ‘more liberal’ measure but had no hope 
of getting it through the house while several caucus members thought that 
the existing legislation was ‘too liberal’. On the other hand, the only way 
of preventing the issue from becoming a racial one was the enfranchisement of 
8 000 Africans straight away thereby forcing M.P.s to take notice of their 
African constituents. In any case Todd did not expect to see any further 
adjustment for about ten years. Perhaps impressed by this last prediction, 
the majority of the Group agreed to support the Prime Minister, but, at the 
same time, the meeting
also generally felt that the matter should not be rushed now as the 
general mood of the country was not propitious for any reasonably 
liberal measure: it would therefore be better to leave things as they 
were.
The two great fears were that the U.R.P. might split over the question and 
that the European electorate — already, as Todd himself told the meeting, 
being asked to accept a large volume of ‘native’ legislation — might reject 
all liberal measures and support the opposition Dominion Party. Members 
would have preferred to delay the issue for a year or more, consolidate 
European opinion and ensure party unity before enfranchising even those 
‘respectable’ Africans who might be expected to exercise the vote in a 
‘responsible’ way. Unfortunately Todd was determined to proceed. All the
s> Leys, European Politics in Southern Rhodesia, 222-3. 
32 For Todd’s proposals, see ibid., 229-30.
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chairman could do was to appeal to the Prime Minister ‘to give the party 
a chance to support him in this’.33
It is evident that while some members favoured a moderate extension 
of the territorial and federal franchise, and did so on the basis of what they 
saw to be just and equitable, the Group as a whole handled the representation 
question as a matter of how best to allay European fears, maintain party 
unity and short-circuit African extremism. The over-riding considerations 
were that territorial changes should not endanger European rule in Southern 
Rhodesia and that federal changes should be sufficient only to preserve the 
existence of the Central African Federation. If, therefore, within Southern 
Rhodesia, these Bulawayo liberals were ahead of majority white opinion both 
in perceiving and accepting the necessity of moderate reform, they were 
a long way short of wanting or expecting a radical shift in the balance of 
racial dominance. Nor did they share the idealism or crusading zeal of the 
Salisbury-based Capricorn African Society34 or the Inter-racial Association;35 *
they were not the kind to entertain fanciful dreams of a multi-racial society. 
The Group’s main direct concern for African advancement lay in the area 
ci industrial conciliation and trade unionism and, even here, a dislike of 
trade unions in principle and an unwillingness to combat white unionists 
in practice, hampered attempts to mark out a positive and progressive 
policy.35 Always the instinct was for change, but for change which did not 
antagonise the European electorate and which had the overall aim of 
establishing a rational and settled economic order, an environment where 
business could flourish and where those with initiative, regardless of race, 
could prosper. Time and again the Group re-affirmed its faith in partnership, 
no one advocated extending or retaining the existing discriminatory practices. 
Yet at no stage in the mid-1950s did these Bulawayo liberals conceive of
33 Todd did eventually accept another amendment which further weakened the 
‘liberality’ of the franchise. For the final territorial franchise see ibid., 230, and Palley, 
The Constitutional History and Law of Southern Rhodesia, 309-12.
34 The Capricorn Africa Society was formed in 1949 to promote the idea of a 
united British East and Central Africa. By 1956-7 the Society was committed to the 
principle of a multiracial state based on a common citizenship and a franchise where citi­
zens could have up to six votes. The Society’s plans were probably impractical, the mem­
bers certainly were. Although the Society believed that changes in the franchise should 
not endanger ‘civilisation’ it had the reputation of being dangerously radical and wildly 
idealistic.
33 The Inter-racial Association of Southern Rhodesia was formed in Salisbury in 
1952. The first chairman was Hardwicke Holderness, the most ‘liberal’ of the members 
of the U.R.P. Parliamentary caucus. Unlike Capricorn the Association focused on im­
mediate and specific if nonetheless important issues — for example, industrial concilia­
tion and African trade unionism; like Capricorn it was regarded in the white community 
as eccentric and, if anything, even more dangerously radical because of a deliberate 
cultivation of social contacts with Africans. Both organizations had lost their momentum 
by 1958.
3« See the discussions in AC3/8/1. 5 and 19 Apr. and 3 May 1956, 28 Mar. and 
16 Apr. 1957. See also the sub-committee reports on the proposed Industrial Concilia­
tion Bill, AC3/7/1/5-7 (Memorandum on the Industrial Conciliation Bill; . . . the 
findings on . . .  ; memo and letter by B. Goldstein, 25 June 1957).
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doing anything more than modifying the economic or political structure, or 
consider whether minor adjustments would be sufficient to enlarge African 
prospects. Nor did they see any urgent need for reform. Whereas some Euro­
peans in Salisbury were advocating immediate and drastic steps towards 
African advancement members of the Action Group, no doubt reflecting 
the attitudes of most liberal whites, believed that their progressive position 
was a step ahead of the current political realities.
Events in 1958 caused a new departure in the history of the Action 
Group. Hitherto there had been a broad identity of views as well as of 
interests, and all members belonged to the territorial and federal governing 
parties. In early 1958, however, there occurred a division in political loyalties 
created by a split within the newly merged U.F.P. in Southern Rhodesia; 
by mid-year the Group was composed of politically hostile camps; by mid- 
1959 it seemed that the breach was complete and irrevocable.
The strains within the U.F.P. surfaced on 9 January 1958 when Todd 
returned from a South African holiday to be informed by his Cabinet 
ministers of their intention to resign. Ostensibly they objected to the way the 
Prime Minister had recently issued revised labour regulations; it soon emerged 
that the real objection was to the liberal substance as much as the dictatorial 
style of his leadership.37 The ministry never liked Todd’s ‘pro-native’ stand 
during 1957, they liked it even less in an approaching election year. Much 
to their astonishment, and disappointment, Todd accepted the resignations 
and appointed a new ministry based on the small liberal group within the 
U.F.P. caucus. A few weeks later, on 8 February, Todd delivered a brilliant 
self-defence at a party congress held in Salisbury and although deposed as 
leader in favour of Sir Edgar Whitehead, who was then in Washington, 
mustered sufficient strength to retain a place in Whitehead’s Cabinet. The 
conservatives within the U.F.P. were not satisfied. They wanted to remove 
Todd altogether and their next chance came when Whitehead failed to win 
a by-election for a Bulawayo seat recently vacated in order to bring the new 
Prime Minister into the Legislative Assembly. Todd was blamed for the 
defeat and on 23 April a motion of confidence in Whitehead was carried in 
caucus by 14 votes to 8. Seven of the dissidents, led by Todd, walked out. 
They re-formed the old U.R.P. and presented themselves to the electorate on 
5 June as the party of common sense progressives in opposition to frightened 
and unthinking reaction. Perhaps from this vantage point of time the striking 
thing about the revived U.R.P. was its caution and moderation; in 1958 the 
white electorate dismissed it as too radical. The bulk of the vote was divided
37 Hatty was one of the Ministers who made the move against Todd although he was 
less vehement in opposition and appeared to regret the whole affair; this is clear from 
a pro-Todd account of the crisis, Personal Papers of Mr Hardwicke Holderness (at the 
time of my research these papers were in Mr Holderness’s private possession but are 
now lodged at The Centre of International and Area Studies, University of London).
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between the Dominion Party and the U.F.P. with Whitehead being returned 
on the preferences of Todd’s party. The U.R.P., having no parliamentary 
representation and no prospects, pondered the problem of whether to become 
less or more liberal. In June 1959 it was launched as a new organisation — 
the Central Africa Party — which was avowedly multiracial in composition 
and objective and seemed, for a time, to present a clear alternative to white 
and black-led politics.
A majority within the Action Group supported Todd throughout 1958 
and 1959. Two members stood for the U.R.P. in the June elections, several 
worked for U.R.P. candidates in Bulawayo, half a dozen became prominent 
members of the Matabeleland branch of the Central Africa Party.3® Yet 
there was a substantial minority, including the three sitting M.P.s (Greenfield, 
Abrahamson, Hatty) and three prospective M.P.s (Goldstein, Clark, Hopkins), 
who supported Whitehead from February 1958 and few of them disguised 
their pleasure at Todd’s departure from government and parliament.
At first sight the remarkable thing was that the Group survived at all. 
There were certainly some extremely awkward moments. Pro-Todd members 
were angry about the way in which Greenfield seemed to manipulate the 
February congress and about what they saw as a conspiracy to remove their 
leader.'9 The June elections created problems when Colonel Webb and 
Abrahamson opposed each other in the Bulawayo East constituency and 
Group members took executive office in either the U.R.P. or U.F.P. For a 
time, indeed, meetings had to be suspended and were only resumed on the 
understanding that members would not be required to join the U.F.P. and 
that the emphasis in future would be given to studying political events rather 
than attempting to influence them.38 940
On the other hand there were at least two factors which held the Group 
together. First both sides were able to agree about what was the basic issue: 
either to embrace ‘clear cut liberalism’ or a ‘more middle of the road policy’.4''
38 Wigley was chairman and Jousse was treasurer of the Southern Rhodesian division 
of the C.A.P. Other leading Action Group members included Gibbs, Lewis, A. D. H. 
Lloyd and Dr I. Sacks. Sacks was a Bulawayo dentist who had supported the Inter­
racial Association and who in the mid 1950s had gone further than the other Association 
members in advocating franchise extensions for Africans; see Concord (December 1956), 
35. For Lloyd see below, note 52. Ashton was another Group member who had supported 
the C.A.P. until 1960 when he became ‘disillusioned’ with Todd, interview with Ashton, 
23 Apr. 1974.
39 Interviews with Gibbs, 23 Apr. 1974; Lewis, 27 Apr. 1974; Wigley, 24 Apr. 1974, 
The U.F.P.-C.A.P. members of the Group believed that Greenfield headed a move by 
former E.P. members to remove Todd from the leadership of the U.F.P.' in Southern 
Rhodesia because he was too critical of the Federal Government and was making too 
many ‘liberal’ gestures. Among the allegations against Greenfield was that he used his 
position as chairman of the congress to invalidate votes which would have been cast 
in favour of Todd. Greenfield strenuously denied all the claims of bias, interview with 
Greenfield, 24 Apr. 1974.
«o AC3/8/1. 3 Oct. 1958: 
at Ibid., 19 June 1958.
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This was important because it meant there was no confusion or misunder­
standing to add tension to disagreement. In the second place both sides 
persuaded themselves that their dispute resulted from a differing assessment 
of the political situation: whether the real threat to liberalism was represented 
by the Dominion Party or the right wing of the U.F.P. Precisely because 
they regarded themselves as moderate liberals the U.F.P. supporters were 
worried about Todd’s ‘extremism’ antagonising the European electorate and 
causing it to vote for the Dominion Party. The Todd supporters in early 1958 
were less worried about the electorate than about the strength of a right 
wing in the U.F.P. caucus which they considered to be Dominion Party in all 
but name.41 So long as the argument could continue on these lines, as 
it did for much of 1958, the debate could take place within a framework of 
agreed assumptions. In any case as Agar, the Group’s chairman, said in his 
annual report for 1958, while the division of opinion was fundamental 
‘members are sufficiently united for the greater proportion of their political 
views.’43 Agar’s point was in part verified when, despite his close identification 
with the U.F.P. in Bulawayo, two pro-Todd members nominated him for 
another term and other U.R.P. members assured him that he was the person 
best fitted to hold office in the existing circumstances.
The Action Group was closely involved in the crisis of 1958. Todd 
addressed two meetings and Whitehead one,44 half a dozen members attended 
the February congress and even more were active in either of the two party 
organisations. Yet because collective action was impractical collective influence 
was impossible. For the next few years the Group had to accept it could no 
longer affect the course of events and instead, guided by the U.R.P. and 
Central Africa Party members, immersed itself in discussion and research 
on a variety of issues relating to African advancement.
A crucial change after 1958 was the recognition within the Group of a 
new situation both in Southern Rhodesia and in Africa at large. On 14 June 
1960 Hugh Ashton pointed out how African states to the north were 
acquiring their independence, the Soviet Union was becoming involved in 
African affairs and African opinion in Southern Rhodesia, once safely 
ignored, had now to be taken into account. By 1960 a majority in the Group 
accepted that extensive reform was necessary to contain African extremism 
and agreed with Ashton’s criticisms of Welensky and Whitehead for their 
hectoring and lecturing approach to Africans, their failure to educate the 4
42 Ibid., 27 Apr. 1958.
. *3AC3/11/1 [Reports: Chairman’s Annual Reports, 1955/6-67], 3 Oct. 1958.
44 Todd spoke on 31 January between the formation of his new ministry and the 
U.F.P. congress, and on 25 April after leaving the U.F.P. parliamentar ycaucus. White- 
head spoke on 27 April and his remarks were notable fo rhis analysis of the prejudices 
and voting behaviour of the European electorate, the U.F.P. caucus and the U.F.P. 
branches. He made it auite clear that his own views were controlled b ythe lean to the 
right in branches, the party and the electorate.
I. R. H A N C O C K 7 9
European electorate Ho face the new Africa’ and their tardiness in eliminat­
ing racial discrimination. Alongside these objections, and a strong attack 
on Whitehead’s repressive legislation following the Emergency of February 
1959, the Group developed franchise proposals for Southern Rhodesia to 
bring the ‘responsible’ African leaders within the electoral system and called 
for sweeping changes to discriminatory legislation and practice. During the 
period from 1959 to 1962 sub-committees and special meetings considered 
detailed plans for repealing the Land Apportionment Act and the pass regula­
tions45 and for introducing better urban housing for Africans, a fixed minimum 
wage46 and a proper system of job grading. In accord with the new outlook 
the Group decided to widen its own membership and in mid-1960 admitted 
three Africans — having initially scrutinised and cleared them of any 
nationalist affiliations.47 Earlier, on 10 September 1959, the Group heard its 
first black speaker, Mike Hove, the member for Matabeleland in the Federal 
Assembly, who re-assured the Group that Africans were by and large content, 
except for specific matters like the franchise, land, education and wages. 
Unfortunately there is no record of whether Hove or his audience were aware 
of the irony or the contradiction involved in this estimate.
One area where the Group became strongly critical was the performance 
of the Federal Government. It has already been shown how members attacked 
Malvern for the slow pace of activity. After 1958, with the very existence 
of the Federation under challenge, the tone became more hostile with the 
main thrust being directed at the Government’s brusque treatment of African 
complaints and at Welensky’s antagonistic attitude towards African aspira­
tions. On 8 April 1960 Agar suggested that a propaganda campaign should 
be launched in the United States to counter adverse criticism. The meeting 
ignored his proposal and curtly observed that the best defence for the Federa­
tion would be ‘to put its own house in order’. On June 1960 when Federal 
M.P.s in the Group complained about the Government not receiving credit 
for its positive achievements, their remarks were greeted by a ‘stony silence’. 
Basically, having in mind the economic advantages and potential, the Group 
wanted the Federation to continue but a majority of members wanted to 
re-shape the Constitution and the Government’s policies. They saw the 
problem in terms of Africans rejecting the Federation because of residual 
fears of European domination and of delays in African advancement. As a 
result the Group’s memorandum to the Monckton Commission was almost *
*5 See, for example, the material in AC3/7/1/18 (Disabilities of Africans [1960] ).
46 At a meeting on 4 October 1962 Lewis put forward what his fellow members 
regarded as a ‘revolutionary’ proposal that there should be a minimum wage of £19.10s. 
per month.
47 The three Africans were J. S. Moyo, Grey Bango and P.-Mhlanga. All of them 
had connections at that time with either the U.F.P. or the C.A.P..-none became regular 
attenders at Group meetings. Two other Africans were later asked to join and tentative 
efforts were made to enrol Coloureds and Asians.
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entirely devoted to schemes for meeting African objections.40 While the 
initial proposition was that only individuals could effect a change in attitudes 
the memorandum went on to show how change could be facilitated by struc­
tural and legislative amendments. Several suggestions were made: setting 
the northern territories on the road to self government while withholding 
dominion status from Southern Rhodesia, the return of some federal powers 
to the territories and the sharing of others, the removal of the federal capital 
from Southern Rhodesia, the creation of a Senate and a Bill of Rights and 
a judiciary independent of appointments by the Federal Government as safe­
guards against racial discrimination, the widening of the franchise and the 
abolition of the dual roll. In all the objective was to establish a ‘real 
partnership’ in place of the sham of the previous seven years and ‘to ensure 
that genuine African leadership has a recognised and honourable place in the 
Federal structure’ without allowing ‘extremist minority opinion . . .  to dictate 
■decisions’.
In terms of its own past, and of what the large majority of Europeans 
would ever concede, the various Action Group proposals of 1959 to 1960 
could be considered quite radical. Yet there remained severe limitations on 
how far its members would go. For one thing they were not converted to 
the idea of immediate African majority rule. When in March 1960 a congress 
in Gwelo resolved to lower the Central Africa Party’s requirements for the 
franchise to basic literacy the Action Group members of the party resigned 
'their membership. In taking this step they highlighted one of the dilemmas 
which confronted all white liberals in the period after Todd’s electoral demise 
Whether to trim their policies to win back the minority white electorate or 
expand them to attract the unenfranchised black majority.49 In March 1960 
the Central Africa Party members of the Action Group still believed it was 
•possible to liberalise the Whites provided there was no immediate prospect 
of black rule. Further, they believed that the Africans themselves could be 
persuaded to join white-led rather than black-led parties, a delusion they 
shared with those who remained in the Central Africa Party in 1961 and 
1962 Or followed Sir Edgar Whitehead in the U.F.P. For years the entire 
■Group had disputed the claims of an ‘extremist minority’ to represent African 
opinion in any part of the Federation. Even Hugh Ashton, considered to be 
ver^ liberal by his colleagues, and certainly more alive than a lot of them 
to African aspirations, could still argue on 14 June 1960 about the danger of 
Africans rejecting European leadership and forming their own parties; and 
this at a time when the National Democratic Party was flourishing and white- 
led multiracial organisations had palpably failed. Perhaps Ashton’s judgment
<8 AC3/7/1/19 (Some thought upon the Constitutional Review , . . [c.1960] ). 
t-.-4® For two analyses'of this dilemma see R. S. G. Todd. ‘White Liberals and the future’, 
Central African Examiner (13 Aug. 1960), 12, and Dissent, 24 Mar. 1960, 17, 3-7.
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had faltered because he lived in Bulawayo and not Salisbury.50 The signific­
ant point, however, is that no one in the Group could or would acknowledge 
the possibility of ending European leadership or domination in Southern 
Rhodesia or in the Federation. If a majority in the Group had come to re­
cognise the urgency of the situation the prevailing view was still for reform 
within the existing system. The tactic remained one of accommodating ‘res­
ponsible’ Africans, the belief persisted that ‘responsible’ Africans still wanted 
to be part of a white-led society.
It was this approach, in conjunction with the split of 1958, which 
hampered effective action after March 1960. Denied access to the inner 
councils of the U.F.P., and having baulked at the idea of black-led politics, 
the majority in the Action Group lacked any kind of power base. Members 
were acutely aware of this. In October and November of 1960 there were 
proctracted discussions on the various alternatives: re-joining the U.F.P., 
amalgamating the U.F.P. and the Central Africa Party, rallying the Central 
Africa Party and the National Democratic Party behind a national leader.51 
These discussions were held at a time when moves were being initiated by 
Bulawayo lawyers and business men to launch a National Front under the 
leadership of Sir Robert Tredgold.52 Another scheme was to use the National 
Convention, a multiracial non-political assembly which met from 31 October 
to 5 November, as the basis for an organisation to unite all races and factions 
in Southern Rhodesia.53 The Group could not make up its mind about either 
of these proposals and both in any case fizzled out for want of support. On 
31 August and 21 September 1961 the Group again debated its future on a 
motion by Peter Gibbs to re-join the U.F.P. His former Central Africa Party 
associates quashed the idea. Whitehead was still anathema and regarded 
as a liability because he was disliked by Whites as well as Blacks. Besides, a 
decision in 1961 to re-join the U.F.P. would have split the Group and all to 
little purpose; as several members pointed out the time was gone when in­
fluence could be exercised from Bulawayo now that Salisbury clearly do­
minated business and politics in Southern Rhodesia. On the other hand it is 
hard to see what the Group could hope to achieve outside of the U.F.P. 
Having rejected the Central Africa Party for being committed to majority
so Ashton regarded the riots in Bulawayo in July 1960 as ‘a terrible shock’. He had 
not been aware of any nationalist politics in Bulawayo regarding the National Democractic 
Party as essentially a Salisbury phenomenon where African nationalism was certainly 
more visible to Europeans, interview with Ashton, 23 Apr. 1974.
si AC3/8/1. especially the discussion of 27 October and 10 November.
52 One supporter of the National Front was A. D. H. Lloyd, a pro-Todd member of 
the 1954-8 Legislative Assembly who was active in the revived U.R.P. and the C.A.P. 
Lloyd was a Bulawayo lawyer, an Irish immigrant who joined the Group for a short 
period in 1960 and 1961. He was one who never forgave Whitehead for the events of 
1958 and always urged the Group to stay out of the U.F.P.
5 3 The Group was much more involved in the Convention and gave £100 towards 
expenses, AC3/3/2 (Balance Sheets, I July 1955-30 Sept. 1963). Malcolm Fleming 
played a leading role in organising support for the Convention in Bulawayo.
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rule in the near future, and regarding both African nationalism and European 
reaction as equally abhorrent, there was nothing left to support save worthy 
but inconsequential causes like the Courtesy Campaign or Build a Nation.S4 
In October 1962 the pro-U.F.P. chairman pleaded with members to develop 
firm objectives and to help retain a liberal government in office.55 At a meeting 
on 9 January 1963 it was resolved unanimously to support the U.F.P. and 
return to active party politics. In the intervening period, however, the Rho­
desian Front had come to power.
The election of the Rhodesian Front meant that for the first time the 
Group found itself in opposition. The implications of this became clear when 
in 1963 Peter Gibbs wrote to Ian Smith, the Minister of Finance, inviting 
him to Bulawayo to talk about the economic situation.56 Gibbs pointed out 
how members of the Group had opposed the Rhodesian Front at the recent 
election. The meeting was never held. There was now no choice but to continue 
the opposition. Members tried to whip up a campaign in Bulawayo to forestall 
U.D.I., they gave money to candidates opposing the Rhodesian Front in the 
1965 elections, a meeting was arranged with British ministers, there were 
talks with other organisations in the hope of establishing a united front. 
Ironically, and significantly, the most determined stand taken by the former 
members of the U.R.P. and the Central Africa Party was their refusal to go 
along with plans to draft Sir Roy Welensky to succeed Whitehead in 1964. 
Welensky was blamed for the break-up of the Federation in 1963; and the 
old priorities had not been forgotten. The difficulty was to find new ones 
which could be implemented. By 1965 the Rhodesian Front looked to be 
invulnerable; and the opposition had virtually disintegrated and, unable to 
attract new and younger members,57 the Action Group began to look like the 
old United Party clique of twenty years before. Occasionally after 1965 there 
were rumblings and stirrings; for the most part meetings were infrequent and 
the attendance dwindled. By 1972 there seemed to be no point in going on.
In one sense the history of the Action Group is bound up with the 
relative position of Bulawayo within Southern Rhodesia and the Central 
African Federation. Throughout the 1950s and the early 1960s members 
repeatedly bemoaned the declining significance of the city and saw this as a 
principal cause of their own diminishing influence. There were, it has been
64 The Courtesy campaign was launched by a group of Salisbury women in late 1960 
and was designed to persuade the races to be nice to each other. The Build a Nation 
campaign of early 1962 sought to register African voters in defiance of the National 
Democratic Party. Some Group members were unhappy because Build a Nation was 
run by U.F.P. officials. They need not have been bothered. The campaign was a dismal 
failure.
ss AC3/11/1, 11 Oct. 1962.
56 A C/3/1/1 (Correspondence and Other Papers: General, 15 Feb. 1955-18 Dec. 
1973), Gibbs to Smith, 13 July 1963.
57 The point was often made at meetings in the late 1960s that the membership was 
getting old and there was ineffectual talk about attracting a younger generation.
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shown, other specific factors: the spirt of 1958, the absence of a power base 
between 1960 and 1962, the advent of the Rhodesian Front. Even so it is 
not easy to find evidence at any stage of influence being exercised on govern­
ment policy as distinct from party affairs. One member in 1958 wondered 
whether ministers had ever really taken the Group into their confidence and 
he regarded past influence as ‘largely academic’. Annual Reports might claim 
there was ‘little doubt’ about the Group exercising ‘quite an influence in 
political circles’, or boast ‘some effect’ in bringing about the fusion of 1957 
or co-ordinating the territorial and federal franchise. What these reports do 
not reveal are examples of deliberations directly affecting the course of official 
policies. Garfield Todd certainly had a high estimate of the members’ ability 
and of their importance, Julian Greenfield thought it worthwhile to cancel 
a parliamentary trip to Kariba and attend a meeting following Todd’s Gwelo 
speech in June 1956, five federal ministers spoke to the Group in that same 
year. Yet for all the energy and effort, and the role played in territorial politi­
cal affairs, especially in Matabeleland, the Group was never able to achieve 
its objectives of the 1950s: an accepted federal system, dynamic federal poli­
cies for expansion, the right conditions for the general economic progress of 
the Federation.
Instead, by the late 1950s, members were having to resign themselves 
to the probable break-up of the Federation. By then the over-riding issue 
had become the situation in Southern Rhodesia, and the sane and pragmatic 
liberals of Bulawayo were caught up in something for which they had no 
answer and over which they had no control. Unable to speak in a single 
voice they, like other white liberals in the early 1960s, just floundered about 
hoping to be heard. More important, however, members of the Action Group, 
in company with those Europeans who hovered on the liberal fringe of the 
U.F.P., had not in their hearts abandoned the framework of European 
supremacy. As liberals they were caught arguing for a compromise when the 
extremes would not budge, as Europeans they preferred a compromise which 
would sacrifice little or nothing of their own interests
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